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BOOK REVIEWS
(Second edition.) By I. Maurice Wormser.
New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co. 1935. pp. xvi, 667. $6.00.

CASES ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGES.

Mr. Wormser's first appearance in the field of mortgages was when he edited a
second edition of Kirchwey's Cases, in 1917. This was followed by his own book
of which a new edition became necessary because of the bearing of the depression
upon the real estate mortgage. The statutory moratorium, as upheld by the Supreme
Court, has left results that should be noticed in the class room; and of equal
importance is that other line of state legislation, as illustrated by recent laws of
New York, which throws safeguards around the deficiency decree.
These points are developed in the present edition, by cases and references that
are quite sufficient for the student's needs. While he was about it, however, Mr.
Wormser inserted material upon several topics that were absent from the earlier
collection. Thus the present edition will enable the teacher to develop the proposition
that the mortgage takes different forms in various parts of the country. For example,
in Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia, the mortgage is effected
by conveyance to a third party in trust for the holder of the mortgage note, with
full power of sale in case of default; and in quite a number of states there is the
right of statutory redemption after foreclosure. So widespread, indeed, is the latter
right (although it is purely statutory and is never to be considered as related to
he ancient equity of redemption) that it is a feature of the Uniform Mortgage Law,
which was proposed some years ago for general adoption by the states. It is
necessary that the student should realize that there are these diversities, and a case
book should not let them go without mention.
The present edition is ample in that regard, but the author does not let such things
divert him from his main purpose, which is to set forth the characteristics which
attach to the security transaction when real estate is the subject matter. In this
respect the book occupies a position that is far above that assumed by a certain type
of latter day case book. The difference, I think, is that Mr. Wormser does not
regard the mortgage merely as a "device," with all the implications which attend
the use of that word. On the contrary, he regards it as a subject that deserves
serious study from the ground up, a study that can only be developed in the light
of equitable principles and origins. When it is so regarded, the mortgage, whatever
form it may be given by local practice, always retains its real features. Thus the
Virginia "trust," although usually foreclosed by exercise of the power of sale, is
a sister of the New York mortgage which is foreclosed by suit and decree. There
are always the same fundamentals, a loan and security, a borrower with the right
to redeem, and a lender with the right to resort to his security. When the student
gets this into his head, and realizes that the whole picture was etched into our
jurisprudence by the strong .waters of equity, the rest is plain sailing. But to get
the proper light upon such a picture, the student should be led to good sources.
Therein Mr. Wormser's work is good. This edition has new material, of course,
but more of the old has been retained than is usual in such cases. The mortgage
is not viewed against a flat background of modem American cases; on the contrary
there is an unusual proportion of English cases-not merely the classics, but decisions
rendered by the English courts within recent years. Also, there are appeals, in
Privy Council and House of Lords, which show the development of the mortgage
in other lands wherein we have interest-Ireland, Canada, Australia. There is a
cultural value in this broad view of the mortgage which Mr. Wormser could not have
offered had he confined, his collection to United States cases of the latest dates to
be found.
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Guided by a book of this sort, one's study of the mortgage is necessarily basic
and unitary. There are no side excursions, nor should there be. The corporate
mortgage, as such, has no place here; its proper place is in another course. But
one who follows the author's method will find that when he gets through he really
knows what a mortgage is. Thus equipped, he will find that he is quite prepared
for the corporate mortgage and all other developments.
In his preface to the first edition, the author stated that he had intentionally
abstained from "over-indulgence in footnotes." That rule has been somewhat relaxed
in the present edition, although respect is still given to the principle that "a case
book cannot serve the purposes of a text or encyclopedia." With certain courses,
footnotes in case books are undoubtedly of help to both student and instructor. But
the footnote idea has been overplayed in many instances; and certainly, in a case
book which deals with a thing like the mortgage, it is far better to put the teaching
material where it belongs, at the top of the page. There are many things one can
say about the mortgage, but footnotes are not adequate for the purpose. Mr.
Wormser's method, whereby material is afforded by means of well selected cases and
the reprint of typical statutes, with footnote references limited to features which,
although closely related, cannot properly be developed in the body of the book,
seems preferable.
There is one thing more. The mortgage, although ancient of origin, is of daily
use, hence it does not lend itself wholly to seminar methods. There is, however,
a great laboratory which teachers sometimes ignore. In order to appreciate such
features of the mortgage as the right to income, accountings, and the like, -forensic
experience is at least a help. Mr. Wormser not only has taught law, but he has
actually been at the bar. Hence in using the present book, students and teachers
too, will be aided by the point of view of one whose scholarship has been polished
by the experience that is the fortune of the active and successful practitioner.

GARRARD GLENN.f

NEW YoRK LAW OF EVIDENCE. Including Questions, Rules of Evidence, Procedure,
with actual examples taken from the Printed Records on Appeal. Four Volumes.
By Roland Ford. New York: Matthew Bender Co. 1935. pp. xliv, (31), 627;
viii, 629-1354; x, 1355-2172; xiii, 2173-3043. $36.00.
We have nothing but praise for this book. It is a work of such general excellence
and of such extraordinary value to trial lawyers that we consider it worthy of
exemption from the expression of adverse criticism of certain relatively unimportant
details. Such criticism would under the circumstances be captious and itself deserving of disapprobation. Mr. Ford has rendered a unique service to the trial
bar of every state. He has supplemented a clear and comprehensive presentation
of the general rules of the law of evidence and those pertaining to the examination
of witnesses, not merely with the exposition of the reasoning by which those rules
have been arrived at, as set forth in extended excerpts from the opinions of judges,
but he has made conveniently available a vast array of "Examples" from actual
examinations of witnesses, showing just how lawyers peculiarly skilled in the art
have conducted their examinations and, wherever possible, precisely how they have
framed their questions. This is a work which has never so far as we know, been
done by any other commentator on such an extensive scale. It has been done
- Professor of Law, University of Virginia, Department of Law.
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by others to a limited extent.1 But Mr. Ford has presented such a variety of
examples of the examinations of witnesses, direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross, taken
from nearly every kind of case, civil or criminal, that can fall within the jurisdiction
of a state court, that he has, it is fair to say, supplied material upon which the
trial lawyer may draw for helpful suggestion in whatever kind of a case he may have.
In this connection it should be made clear that the richness of Air. Ford's
material has not been diminished by the limitation of his sources of supply to the
"New York Law of Evidence.'
Here in this one state he has found adequate,
even ample, material for the exposition not only of the general principles of the law
of evidence and those pertaining to the examination of witnesses, but also for the
technique of examination in all its phases.
Nor has the value of the work been appreciably impaired by the fact that the
examples which have been taken from the earlier New York cases, when the records
were printed under the old rule requiring that testimony be "reduced to narrative
form," have precluded the possibility of setting forth questions and answers emcty
as given in the court room. In these cases it is not difficult for one to spell out
with reasonable accuracy the form of the questions eliciting the evidence. In those
cases where appeals have been taken since the adoption of the present rule requiring
that the record be printed in "question and an~swer form," the reader has before
him the precise language of the questions propounded to the witness. This book
supplies the need, so far as any book can do so, of the inexperienced trial lawyer
who would perfect himself in the art of examining witnesses.
Evidence is such a tremendous subject, embracing such a multitude of rules,
many of which the average student if left too much to himself is inclined to
consider more or less arbitrary, that the teacher working in the limited time necessarily
allocated to the subject is compelled to confine his attention and that of his classes
to the exposition of the actual rules of the law of evidence and those pertaining
to the examination of witnesses and the reasoning upon which they are based. No
matter how extensive his experience in trial work may have been, no matter how
great his skill may be, no matter how capable he is of giving instruction in the art,
the teacher of evidence has practically no time to devote to the enlightenment of
his pupils in the technique of examination. The result is a -complaint frequently
voiced by the young lawyer: "I know my rules of evidence. I know pretty well
what I can do and what I can't do. But what troubles me is that, when I know
that I am entitled to get certain matters in evidence, I don't know how to frame
my questions." Now, it may be, of course, that the fault does not lie entirely
in the lack of classroom instruction; it may be that in many instances the reasons
for the difficulty are to be found in the man himself. He may lack imagination,
be slow and clumsy in his mental processes, deficient in vocabulary, unready and
maladroit in the use of language. But even one who labors under the handicap
of these defects may do much in the way of supplying his deficiencies by the study
of the "Examples" made available in this work. The benefit that he will derive
therefrom can hardly be measured; but there can be no doubt it will be great.
He will at least see at once how questions should be asked. Later on as be
supplements what he has read in this book by actual experience in the court room
he will realize that he is progressing more rapidly toward the attainment of a
1. The following are a few which may be mentioned: ComLEU s, CnOsS ExunxoN
or Wrr-sszs (1929); WxLar:M, Tim ART or CRoss-EXAMv-ATION (1923); Scsnvrz,
CRoss ExA m-ATIOzq oF PLmrmxTs = PEnsO.NAL IxuuRy Acrzo.s (1923) ; Scmv-,,rz, Tamz,
oF AUTOMOBILE Accimn" CASES (1928); WIGmon, EvinumcE (2d ed. 1923), contains
a relatively small number of specimens of actual examinations.
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respectable degree of skill in the examination of witnesses than would have been
possible had he not availed himself of the assistance so liberally extended by Mr. Ford,
But the aid to be derived from this rich and convenient storehouse of material
is not limited to those who are deficient in native aptitude for trial work. The
reading of these "Examples" cannot fail to sharpen the wits and amplify the powers
of even those who are by nature endowed with the inestimable gifts of perspicacity
and perspicuity. Again, lawyers who are older and more experienced Will find here
much that will augment their wisdom. Even they have not passed the point where
they have nothing to learn from the experience of others. We believe that the
reading of this book will be distinctly beneficial to every practicing lawyer, no
matter what may be the type of his mind, or the stage of his development.
This work, however, is one which in our opinion is not suited to the student still
in law school, (except in connection with moot-court work) and the author probably
never intended it for such. Its very size, the amplitude and nature of its content
render it unsuited to the student. Until one has acquired a knowledge of the general
rules of the law of evidence and those pertaining to the examination of witnesses
and the reasoning upon which these rules are based, he is not prepared to meet
the mass of material which this book contains. He is not fitted to orient himself
and maintain his sense of direction in his passage through such an extensive work.
The law student therefore should defer the study of this work until the completion
of his, regular law course. When he shall have done that then we think that there
is no one text book that he can read with greater benefit than this. When he does
take it up he will, we are confident, experience several agreeable reactions. He
will say to himself and probably to others: "This is not only the most informative
text book that I have ever read, it is the most entertaining; it is the most exciting."
He will feel time after time that he has been transported to a court room; to a
court room tense and vibrating with the varied notes of human interest. He will,
in imagination, see himself standing in the place of the examining counsel; feel
that he himself is the one who is facing the problems of the trial; that it is his
own mind that is functioning; that upon his resourcefulness and skill depend the
outcome; and this may be in a trial where the issue is one of life or death.
This book contains'the elements that make a law book valuable; it is informative,
it is clear, it is accurate and it is interesting. It constitutes a distinct and noteworthy contribution to the bibliographic wealth of the profession.
LLOYD M. HOWELL.+

CRIMINOLOGY.

By Albert Morris.

New York: Longmans, Green & Co.

1934.

pp. xii, 590. $3.50.
As a hand book, this addition to Longman's Social Science series is of value.
Professor Morris undertakes to show who criminals are, how an individual comes
to enter into the criminal clas s of our population, what means to prevent the development of criminal behavior have been devised in our day, the methods employed
to ensure the apprehension and conviction of law-breakers and, finally, the means
used to restrain convicted criminals from continuing their anti-social careers.
The author seems to regard his work as "scientific," since he identifies science
with method-that is to say, with the process which "involves making a working
hypothesis, observing and recording facts, classifying and organizing the data so
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University, School of Law.
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gathered, generalizing, the making and testing of new hypotheses, and the predicting of human conduct."'
On this definition any body of knowledge could be given the name "science,"
and then we should have no criterion for distinguishing philosophy, poetry, history,
or what not, from science. It is probably more accurate to reserve the term
"science" to that knowledge which consists of a system of laws based on some
natural or rational determinism. Method should be regarded as that which marks
what is excellent in science, but not the factor constitutive of it. This is all the
more necessary because criminology, like all social science, is quite destitute of any
laws commensurable with those known to mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry,
or biology.
What is it which passes under the title "criminology"? The answer which one
may gather from an examination of this text book is that it consists of a description
of crimes, the classification of types of criminals and, finally, some historical treatment of ancient and modem procedure in handling criminals. Considerable emphasis
is placed upon the principle that the problem of crime is the problem of the individual
delinquent. Until we learn how to recognize the incipient criminal, we shall be
unable to prevent his emergence from society. But what are the marks of incipient
criminality? Unfortunately, they vary from case to case. To detect in advance
the individual who in some future time will become an available candidate for the
jail or gallows calls for the insight of a genius who has been touched by the gift of
prophecy. It would seem that there are very few detectors of incipient criminality.
While men continue to be direct descendants of Adam, all of them will be sinnersand some of them criminals. The criminal, we have with us always. So the real
question becomes this: what shall we do with criminals if we are efficient and lucky
enough to catch them before they acquire fortunes sufficiently large to enable them
to retire to their country estates, there to enjoy their self-esteem and the respect
of their neighbors? Professor Morris is thoroughly in favor of individualization
of "treatment." He thinks that probation and parole should be more extensively
used, but he is fearful that not enough good can be accomplished by these means.
To solve the crime problem it is necessary, he thinks, to follow the example of the
Mexicans by removing from our courts the power of imposing sentence on convicted
criminals. He says: "Treatment should be based upon individualized study and diagnosis, so that every method used, whether old or new, would be applied intelligently
and purposefully, rather than blindly, as at present. ' 2
This "scientific individualization of treatment would require (a) limitation of the
power of the Courts to the determination of guilt . . . [since] it is obviously silly
for legislators to prescribe in advance, or for judges to fix at the time of trial the
amount and type of punishment which will make a convict safe to receive his
freedom." 3 The time when a prisoner is fit for return to the community should
thus be decided by expert diagnosticians.
The vocabulary of modem treatises on criminology, including the book under
review, is replete with terms like "treatment," "diagnosis" and "adjustment."
Borrowed from the pragmatists by way of biology and physics, they imply an effort
systematically carried out to reduce social phenomena to the bio-physical order.
This reduction process requires the modem criminologist to deny human freedom
and to adopt the belief that human criminal behavior is merely the necessary result
of the convergence in the person of the offender of lines of physical force over
1. P. 3.
2. P. 514.
3. Ibid.
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which he has no control. The criminal is considered to be sick, in the physical
sense of that word.
Let us, therefore, substitute the idea of hospitalization for that of incarceration.
This guinea-pig philosophy also, like the poor and the criminals, is always with us.
It is the enemy of mystery, poetry, responsibility and human dignity-if we may
be permitted to heap together things not obviously related, although in fact they
are intimately connected with one another.
Professor Morris, by means of his book, exemplifies one fact, to wit, that there
is a kind of inevitability about human thought and action when carried out on an
implicit non-reflective level. This we might call the level of sub-intellectual induction.
On it men including Professor Morris are to a considerable extent bound by what
have been called culture compulsives. But the strictly human man transcends this
level and comes to know himself as the carrier of a power to make choices, with
resultant personal responsibility. To have this power of choice it is not required
that one should be a Doctor of Philosophy. Anyone whose conscience has not been
dulled by vice deliberately engaged upon or masked by pedantry, is a free man
and should be treated as such. As a matter of fact, if the American people continue
to retain some vestiges of the common sense for which they have been celebrated,
it is most improbable that they will abandon the traditional belief in the criminal
law predicated upon free will and personal responsibility.
In the opinion of this reviewer, the chief merit of the work of Professor Morris
consists in the clear, temperate way in which he reports facts and describes current
opinions. The principal defect of the book resides in its implied and expressed
philosophy. To this philosophy we raise a single objection, namely, it is unsophisticated.
EDMUND C. COLLINS.+

TnE IUDICIUM QUINQUEVIRALE. By C. H. Coster. Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy
of America. 1935. pp. vii, 87. $2.25.
The indicium quinqzwvirale was created by a law issued under the names of the
Emperors Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian II (Codex Theodosiantuts, ix, 1, 13; 11
February 376). Governors of suburban provinces were to refer for sentence cases
involving a capital charge against a senator to the Prefect of the City, who would
be assisted by five senators as judges, the indicium quinquevirale, chosen by lot from
present or past holders of administrative offices. Mr. Coster believes that the chief
importance of the statute is as evidence of the powerful position of the senatorial
aristocracy in the later Roman empire. He is inclined to think that Lcrivain was
mistaken in his belief that the hudicium quinquevirale was in existence in Constantinople in the time of Emperor Leo VI (886-911). The indichtun quitqueviralk
established by this statute had jurisdiction only over cases arising in Rome and
the suburban provinces.
Before the establishment of the hidicium quinquevirale relations between the Senate
and the Emperor had reached a critical state. Mr. Coster traces the course of the
struggle from 367 when Valentinian directed the Prefect of Rome to submit to him
all cases against persons of senatorial rank in which the charges were such as to
call for some form of capital punishment. Gratian's measures completely reversed
the policy of his father. The senatorial aristocracy, which had been almost crushed
by Valentinian I, was restored to its full position in the government. The Senate
was protected and favored by a series of laws, of which one of the most important
t

Confidential Assistant to Attorney General, New York State Department of Law.
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was Codex Theodosianus, ix, 1, 13. If the Emperor did not reserve decision for
himself, then the case came either before the appropriate pretorian prefect or, if it
had arisen in Rome or the suburban provinces, before the Prefect of the City and
the iudicium quinquevirale. Mr. Coster argues that the iudidum qtdnqucviralc was
a court of criminal jurisdiction only, dealing solely with serious accusations. In
the absence of further evidence, he supposes that the iudiciuin qutiquevirale had
jurisdiction over charges of treason as well as other capital crimes.
More than one-third of the monograph is devoted to the discussion of the trial of
Boethius. Of these twenty-three pages not more than three are concerned directly
with the trial itself and the problem of the iudiciun quinqucvirale. The three questions which Mr. Coster seeks to answer are: what was the crime with which Boethius
was charged? before whom was he tried? was he guilty? The general opinion from
the sources has been that Boethius was accused of treason and magic, tried in his
absence by the Senate and condemned, kept in prison by Theodoric for some time
after his condemnation, and finally executed. Mr. Coster agrees that the charge
was treason and magic. Cessi, Bury, and Sundwall hold that Boethius was not
condemned by the Senate. Mr. Coster thinks that he was, but that the action
had no effect on his fate. He does not feel that he can state that Boethius, and
perhaps Albinus and Symmachus, were tried by the iudidunt quinquevirale, but he
does feel that the evidence presented points to that conclusion, not only by an
affirmative hint in Aiwnymous Valesianus, but by its exclusion of other tribunals.
Possibly Mr. Coster is right, but the evidence is slight and not wholly convincing.
Mr. Coster concludes that Boethius was guilty of trying to suppress the evidence
of acts which he knew would amount to treason in the eyes of Theodoric. He
dismisses the charges of divination as ignorant or insincere interpretation of his
scientific activities.
Is it a sufficient explanation of the small amount of evidence for the iudidum
quinquevirale to say that the sources (historians, chroniclers, letters, apologies) are
seldom interested in the legal aspect of state trials? Do the statutes of Gratian
and Honorius, the trial during the reign of Theodoric, prove that the hididumn qzdnquevirale was an important and living institution? Mr. Coster has made the most
of every bit of evidence, he has hazarded elaborate reconstructions, but the significance
which he attaches to the iudidum quinquevirale seems to this reviewer unwarranted.
There is no separate bibliography, references are cited in the notes. The notes
are placed at the back of the book, a great inconvenience in a monograph of this type.
ANN

JoHN JAY. By Frank Monaghan.
$4.00.

New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.

SE-EDY.t

1935.

pp. 497.

When, in what Lord Acton calls the ardor of rising absolutism, Louis XIV revolted
the Edict of Nantes, other soils gained the Huguenot strength, shrewdness and talent.
John Jay's grandfather, Auguste Jay, was a Huguenot refugee.
Sixty years after the revocation, in 1745, John Jay was born in New York City.
In order to appreciate him it is essential that we understand his background. His
ancestors bequeathed to him, and to all their progeny, a deep and abiding antiCatholicism, which they strengthened by their system of education. Air. Monaghan
says: "This consciousness of a background of persecution and of popish cruelty
was a family heritage... during his youth he was untouched by, indeed was unaware

t Member of the New York Bar.
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of, any of the new deistic thought of the age-the wicked insinuations of libertines."1
The first evidence of this prejudice Jay reveals in the address to the people of Great
Britain, which he wrote for the first Continental Congress. In it he appealed to
the "no-popery" spirit of the British who had been alarmed by the liberal terms of
the Quebec Act, which had given religious freedom to Catholics in Canada. This
perfect expression of his own private feelings modified Canadian enthusiasm for the
American cause, and later, when he wrote the congressional letter asking for aid
the Canadians remembered, and refused.
Similarly, when Jay, whom Mr. Monaghan regards as the author of the Constitution of the state of New York, was working in the convention that drafted the
instrument, he proposed to give Catholics civil rights only on the condition that
they swear in court that no priest, pope or foreign authority have power to absolve
them from allegiance to the state. Yet this man was an important factor in both
Continental Congresses, the author of the first important state constitution, the
negotiator of our peace, and our first Chief Justice. All this Mr. Monaghan reveals
slowly and with great care. Manuscripts have been opened to him which no historian has ever seen before and the author has handled them carefully, conscious
of his task and of his privilege.
This book might very well be called "The Evolution of a Patriot." Jay had
been sent to the first 'Congress by the conservative element of New York. As a
conservative he supported the Galloway plan. It was clearly against the desire of
the conservatives that he signed the non-importation agreement called the "Association." He did not want a war but having it, accepted it. Yet he accepted it
with reservations, for as late as 1778 he regarded it as a physical attempt to restore
harmony. Events, as Mr. Monaghan shows, shaped his mind and he allowed it
to grow. Professor Schlesinger has called the Revolution a state of mind and the
growth of that mind is in many respects the growth of John Jay. Long after the
war was over he wrote: "It has always been and still is my opinion and belief, that
our country was prompted and impelled to independence by necessity and not
by choice." 2 Jay, who had been made President of the Second Congress, was sent
to Spain to get aid, physical or financial. We know he got neither. What he did
get was training in the ways of diplomats. While in Spain he was chosen as one
of the emissaries to make peace with Great Britain.
That America has never won a peace conference is almost a proverb in the
American mind. Like most proverbs it is not true and is believed. Mr. Monaghan
does much to dissipate it. The peace of 1783 he shows to be one of our most
brilliant triumphs. It is one of his best chapters. Jay, picking his way with caution,
suspicious of both France and Spain, hating his instructions, making his own peace,
all this the author tells with full consciousness of its dramatic interest and of his
ability to dramatize it. These instructions were, in effect, to consult France at
every turn. Franklin regarded them as binding: "'But, surely, Jay, you would not
deliberately break those instructions?'
"'If those instructions conflict with the fundamental honor and dignity of America,
I would break them', and here Jay swiftly rose and hurled his long clay pipe into
the fireplace, 'like this.' The pipe, in a hundred pieces, lay among the ashes and
the glowing embers. Mr. Jay had reached a decision." 3 If Jay had done nothing
else than negotiate this peace America would be, and is, in his debt forever.
Jay was, too, a member of the New York convention that ratified the Constitution.
1. P. 25.

2. P. 85.
3. P. 197.
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He also contributed to the Federalist Papers which, however, were largely the work
of Hamilton. Andrew McLaughlin in his new Constitutional History reminds us
that: "The Federalist probably had more effect after the new government went into
operation, than in the days of uncertainty when the fate of the union seemed to
hang in the balance." 4 To mention this is not to disparage the Federalist, but it
makes all the stronger Mr. Monaghan's case for the great influence of Jay's Address
to the People of New York in turning that great state to the Constitution.
Of particular interest is the treatment of Jay as Chief Justice. It was Jay who
refused to allow the Supreme Court to become a part of Hamilton's machinery; he
refused to allow the Court to refer to the financial structure of Hamilton, to allow
it to give advice to the executive. It is well to remember about him the following
things. "Sitting in the circuit court Jay had the pleasure of asserting the principle
that treaties formed a part of the highest law in the land and thus declared invalid
a state law which infringed upon the provisions of a treaty. In the same court he
declared another state law invalid because it was contrary to that part of the Constitution which upheld the obligation of contracts against state action. In 1792 he
held that an Act of Congress was invalid because it was contrary to the constitution.
The decision in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia was an important blow at state
sovereignty ...

it was an early forecast of the bias against the pretensions of state

sovereignty that the court later manifested under Marshall. His decision in Glass
v. Sloop Betsy did as much as any other single decision of the court to assert the
sovereignty and international rights of the United States.' 5
The chapter on the famous Jay Treaty seems to me less satisfactory. Air.
Monaghan gives me the impression that he is trying to minimize its badness. The
twelfth article, forbidding American vessels to carry molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa
and cotton to any ports in the world save their own, is even now incredible. It
is true that Hamilton was greatly responsible for the bad treaty, yet while Jay had
been secretary for foreign affairs he had sent a secret report to Congress justifying
England's holding the western forts. Jay was willing to give up the navigation
of the Mississippi in 1786-Mr. Monaghan finds a technical reservation here, i.e.,
Jay was unwilling to yield our right to navigate. Mr. Monaghan admits the distinction-but were the pioneers stupid because they felt Jay had held the rind and
let the fruit go? Mr. Monaghan points out that the signature of Great Britain
to a treaty with us was an event of epochal significance. There are those of us
who do not think so--nor did Hamilton, who said it was the work of "an old woman."
Bowers in his Hamilton and Jeffersonc finds Hamilton standing behind Jay "holding
a mirror

. . .

which reflected the American negotiators' cards to the enlightenment

of the suave and smiling Grenville." But Jay's mind, it seems to me, was not
running at top speed from the beginning. He did not regard it as extraordinary
that England should not adopt our principle of neutrality-free goods, free ships-at
the very time he was negotiating. This Mr. Monaghan seems to regard as realistic,
but it is this sort of realism that led President Wilson's ambassador to Great Britain,
Walter Hines Page, to commit treason to his country in the Dacia case. "Grenville,"
says Mr. Monaghan, "had finesse, but Jay had congenital suspicions." Finesse, I
think, is preferable especially when even the suspicions retreat. Mr. Monaghan
finds it hard to see wrong in his hero.
But we can afford to admit wrong in a man, who as Governor of New York
refused the proposal of Hamilton to redistrict New York, thus making the electoral
vote Federalist, a man who therefore allowed the election of Jefferson in whose
4.
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principles he did not believe. That act of honor outweighs treaties, most eloquence
and a thousand silly wars.
Mr. Monaghan has pickled the times and the man in a strong brine--the Revolution, the Congresses, the Adams-Lee alliance, our early aims, our early achievements;
none of it is far away, it is our own and those of us who run should pause to read.
FRANCIS DowNiNo.'f

GROWTH OF LAW. By William A. Robson. New York: The
1935. pp. xv, 354. $2.50.

CIVILIZATION AND THE

Macmillan Co.

The author, Barrister-at-Law of Lincoln's Inn, Reader in Administrative Law in
the University of London, Doctor of Philosophy, Master of Laws and Bachelor of
Science in Economics, has published five earlier works. In the present treatise he
refers to works on the laws and customs of Hittites, Kaffirs, Bedouins, Hindus, Egyptians, Japanese, Chinese, Mohammedans, Romans, Greeks, Teutons, Celts, Hebrews
and Polynesians. He cites works of philosophy, both general and legal. He alludes
to general histories as well as to special historical treatments of economics, law,
political and social ideas, institutions, and religions. Use is made of volumes dealing
with jurisprudence, anthropology, international law, biography, semantics, ethics,
psychology, economics, demography, sociology and political science. Among dictionaries and encyclopedias, he has employed the Oxford Dictionary, Dictionary of
National Biography, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences, Jewish Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia Britannica, and the Encyclopedia
of the Laws of England. When he desires to speak of modern science, its methods
and meaning, he utilizes the writings of Pearson, Sullivan, Whitehead, Ritchie, Cohen,
Wolf, Singer, Eddington, Jeans, Planck, Dingle and MacIver.
Well-what do we make of all this? The argument of the book has three movements. In the first part there is discussion of the origins of law; then a treatment of
the law of nature and, finally, remarks on the nature of law. In the section on origins,
we are told that men have differed concerning the definition of law-citing Cicero,
Aquinas, Bede Jarrett, Hooker, Kant, Blackstone, Austin, Pollock, Lee, Hartland
and Pound. Nevertheless, on the authority of Malinowski, law originates in custom
and consists, among primitives, of those rules which are too practical to be of concern to religion, and too burdensome to be left to the mere good will of their subjects.' We are not, however, because of Malinowski's findings, to lose sight of the
fact (probably as established to the author's satisfaction by Frazer) that early law
is embedded in a "morass" of superstition, mythological belief, and religion.2 The
primitive is "devoid" of any conception of rational order. 8 He believes, therefore,
that his rulers and his laws are divine. This was true even of Rome. And this
"mystical influence [has] . . . impeded the scientific development of the private
law. . . ." Secularization of law is an immense achievement accomplished in our
own day.
Our author now digresses to a consideration of criminal law in primitive societies,
He tells us of the follies of our savage ancestors, who were ignorant of the necessity
f Instructor of History, Fordham University.
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of looking for the mens rea, and who, consequently, proceeded criminally against
irresponsible humans and, what is more notable, against beasts and inanimate objects
which had injured men. Next there is discussion of the part played in law by curses,
blessings and oaths. And having asserted that the oath is no longer to be regarded as
a satisfactory method for eliciting truth, Professor Robson goes on to declare that
"the time will come when we shall have to deal seriously with the question of inventing new ways of persuading people to tell the truth, in circumstances where
their private interests may be adversely affected by their so doing, by some method
which does not rely upon an outworn creed [that is, belief in God] and a threat no
longer feared [that is, of punishment hereafter]."5
Part One closes with a demonstration of the fact that the Middle Ages knew nothing
of omnipotent legislatures. They had believed in an objective justice antecedent
and superior to all human power to which that power was in subjection. The modem
scientific ideal is, of course, realized in modem England, where we find "the unfettered free secular legislature possessing sovereign power to make new laws as a
deliberate and conscious process." This achievement the modem world accepts "as a
commonplace scarcely deserving of note, but it was utterly beyond the ken of the

medieval world ....

",7

It is difficult to find any principle of unity in the hodgepodge which makes up
Part One. It covers 184 pages and has at least 420 citations. I am reminded of
John Selden's remark on learning: "Mfost men's learning is nothing but History dully
taken up. If I quote Thomas Aquinas for some tenet, and believe it, because the
School-men say so, that is but History. Few men make themselves masters of the
things they write or speak." s
Professor Robson does not seem to trouble himself to make those whom he quotes
(and presumably believes) agree with one another. He accepts Mfalinowski, who
asserts the existence among primitives of certain rules specifically matters of law,
and thus outside mere practice and fashion as well as religion, and yet insists that
among primitives legal rules are embedded in a "morass" of religion, superstition
and myth.
The ancient practice of proceeding against animals, and irrational objects which
had harmed humans, he does not seem to think can be shown to be in any way
rational. It simply reveals the profound ignorance of pre-modem men. Yet there are
at least two explanations which make the practice understandable. Declareuil, discussing the disposition on the part of early Roman law to disregard intention in relation to delicts, said, "The question of imputability [in a material and visual sense]
was the only question raised." 9 While the attention of our forebears was adherent
to the material aspects of wrongful action, we should expect them to be seriously
concerned with visible disturbances in right order caused by non-rational agents. The
formal prosecution of lunatics, animals and inanimate objects, granted the premises
of our ancestors, establishes their rationality, not their lack of it.
And yet, after imputability came to be a matter not merely of physical relationship between effect and cause, but also of the psychological-moral condition of the
wrongdoer, the practice survived of formally proceeding against homicidal animals.
Why? Because punishment, it was thought, might be rightly bestowed where there
was cause, although there was no fault.10 Moreover, the natural horror evoked by
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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the perception of the disorder involved when an animal or any other agency harmed
an innocent man goes far toward explaining the seriousness with which our forefathers set about rectifying the situation.11 Do we behave very differently in our
treatment of mad dogs?
Relative to the practice in the early Middle Ages of using compurgators in order to
acquit one accused of crime, Professor Robson says: "The custom of oath-helpers
arose no doubt from the principle of group responsibility ....
,,12 This is far from
the truth. The practice of requiring in some cases additional oath-takers who would
swear with the accused in favor of his innocence was predicated not on any notion of
collective responsibility, but on the gravity of the offense charged. Thus a woman
might be required to produce seven women 13 to assist her by their oaths. This is
far from illustrating the operation of the principle of collective responsibility as that
term is understood by modem anthropologists. It should also be noticed that the
compurgators were not designated by the defendant alone. Some of them were selected
by the defendant, and were called advocati, while others, chosen by the plaintiff, were
known as nominati. The practice, in short, was not as irrational as Professor Robson
would seem to suppose. As to the admiration for the omnipotent legislature which
Professor Robson manifests, an American cannot for a moment share it. If we have
any political value worth being preserved, it consists in our belief in government by laws
and not by men. Remove that principle, and the American system vanishes.
If we turn now to the second part of the author's argument, we find him telling
us that, until our own times, philosophers and jurists have always believed in the
existence of a natural law which, in respect of human positive law, has been regarded
as the standard of its rightness. This belief in natural law has always operated
as a check to the works of tyranny. In more recent times it has begotten the doctrines of Natural Rights, which smashed the French Ancien Rdgitne, and also the
effective fiction of a State of Nature. Natural Law by imperceptible changes in the
19th century was also invoked to justify the wretched condition of the poor in the
early days of the modem industrial order. Professor Robson treats this most important subject of natural law exactly as one would expect a dilettante to handle it.
Many views of its character are cited, but no effort is made to discriminate the true
from the false in terms of some criterion of truth. The fact of the matter is that
any definition of natural law is necessarily in function of one's entire philosophy.
False views on the meaning of substance, cause, God and similar objects of metaphysics must work a perversion in one's conception of natural law.
To a Scholastic and Theist, natural law has a distinct, firm and intelligible meaning.
It signifies a dictate of practical reason naturally made, that is, spontaneously made
by conscience, bidding the human person to do the good and avoid the evil. It means
also a rule or measure enabling man to discern, on primary questions relating to faceto-face relationships, what is good and what is evil. Its character, moreover, is such
that it binds not hypothetically, but categorically, because it is the eternal law of
God as received by men. Its mandate, finally, though peremptory, is not compelling,
owing to human freedom.
Before passing to the third part of Professor Robson's argument, brief mention
should be made of the declaration appearing on page 206, that Aquinas and the Stoics
art. 4, ad. 3, and the distinction mentioned was thereafter placed in canon law; sine culpa,
nisi subsit cause, non est aliquis puniendus.
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held the same views of reason and nature. This opinion is full of absurdity. The
meaning of the passage cited from Aquinas does not support the author's point.1
In
Part III, our author hopes to "outline a synthesis ....,,15 His fundamental objective
is to reconcile human law with the laws of nature formulated by natural scientists.
To accomplish this he lays down as fundamental this proposition: ". . . it is the
human mind which both formulates the pattern of physical conduct we call natural
law [he means here scientific laws], and also establishes the pattern of social conduct we call human law. Human law, said Spinoza, is a plan of living which men
have laid down for themselves. To which one may add that science is a
plan of knowing which men have laid down for themselves."' 16 In a word,
both the universe of the laws of nature (laws of mechanics, physics, etc..) and the
universe of "jural law," are simply constructs of the human mind. Professor Robson
is here trying to utilize some of the writings of modern students of the theoretic
value of natural science, who have emphasized the mythic elements entering into
the composition of scientific theories, and the abstract character of scientific laws. 17
There can be no doubt that there is some sense in which our knowledge is "subjective."
But the question is in what sense is it such? This is the very heart of the most
difficult problem of epistemology.
To the question "What is the status of our object, of knowledge?" two solutions,
both false, are apt to be proposed. The first, miscalled realism, involves the belief
that the human mind passively receives from "out there" exactly what is existing
there, in the same mode as that in which it is existing. Look and you necessarily
see. The other, often called idealism (the solution adopted by Professor Robson)
involves the formal denial that anything is "out there." What we know we construct or create. These errors are as ancient as philosophic speculation. The truth
is that something is "out there," but we must be prepared in order to "see" it.
But granted preparation (by experience, reflection, normal faculties, etc.) of the
subject-knower, such that it renders him accessible to the object-knowable, then he
submits to it and does not construct it. On the other hand, until a prepared mind
is related to something knowable, that thing is only potentially knowable. The
theorems of Euclid, for example, are "invisible" to an infant's mind. To know
signifies collaboration, therefore, between knower and knowable. Knower and
knowable in the knowing process are both active and passive.
Human Law is, in a manner of speaking, created. I mean that a given positive
law is always a rule chosen from among alternatives. But it is law and not masked
violence only on condition that it is a rule accommodated to the exigencies of an
objective and therefore a given situation. The law, then, before it is conceived, has
objective immanence in respect of the state of facts which, when conceived, it is
intended to order. Once produced, moreover, another type of objectivity is achieved
by law, because it now falls into the objective existential order of cultural objects,
and as such can be known in the same way as we come to know anything else
requiring intelligence. My knowing of human law is from this viewpoint not so
much constitutive of it as it (the law) is constitutive of my knowing. Nevertheless,
14. If anyone is curious about this, he should consult not only SumrsA Timo.Loomt Ia,
IIae, Q. 91, art. 11, ad. 2, which is Robson's passage, but also Ia, Ilae, Q. X, art. I, corpus.
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even here there is a legitimate sense in which I may say that to know is to constitute the object known, in that to know is to constitute an object as an element
of consciousness.
The human legislator and judge, who are said to create law (the former in principle,
the latter for the case), do not proceed by extracting the law from nothing. Their
enactments and decisions are limited by law already existing, as lived by them, and
by innumerable natural facts outside the legal order-facts economic, political,
glandular, climatic, etc., again as lived by them. To know is, in a sense, then, the
same as to create, if by creation we mean a rational selection. Also, to create is
to act according to objective knowledge and other objective facts which serve as
stable limiting principles.
How do human laws compare with laws of science? Human laws and laws of
science are alike in the sense that both are constituted as elements of consciousness
by the creative activity of human mind. They are also alike in that both imply
extra-mental objective situations in which they are immanent before human thought
busies itself with them. They differ by virtue of the fact that laws of the sciences
are formulae, exhibiting the necessary behavior of their objects (these objects need
not exist), while human laws are formulae revealing the forms of action which are
necessary for their objects (men), should these objects freely determine for any
cause, ethical or otherwise, that it is good for them to act as the law directs, or to
omit acting in ways which the law proscribes.
Professor Robson has written a book, animated by a spirit of monistic naturalism,
which is unscholarly, inexact in interpretations, and philosophically false. Tourtoulon
says somewhere that the difference between myth and fiction is that the latter is
understood for what it really is. On this distinction, I suggest that Professor
Robson's book is packed with myths, which, unlike those used in scientific theories,
have not the advantage of clarifying, but succeed rather in befuddling thought.
JAMES VAUO}IAN.f

f Member of the New York Bar.
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